Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games

James Thomas House; George Cybenko

doi:10.1117/12.924760

18 June 2012 Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games

James Thomas House, George Cybenko

Proceedings Volume 8359, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense XI; 835907 (2012) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.924760
Event: SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing, 2012, Baltimore, Maryland, United States

Abstract

We describe a method for the estimation of an opponent's utility matrix in a finite repeated game, given that he selects his actions by a known deterministic algorithm with some unknown parameters. We also investigate the prediction, based on the utility matrix estimate, of this opponent's future actions, and a simple method by which the opponent can counter these efforts. These are posed as a feasibility problem and a convex optimization problem, respectively. Simulation results are also presented.

Citation Download Citation

James Thomas House and George Cybenko "Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games", Proc. SPIE 8359, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense XI, 835907 (18 June 2012); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.924760

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