Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under loser reporting

Wei Huang; Chao Huang; Xiaoyun Pang; Liang Yuan

doi:10.1117/12.2674574

23 May 2023 Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under loser reporting

Wei Huang, Chao Huang, Xiaoyun Pang, Liang Yuan

Proceedings Volume 12604, International Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing (ICCAID 2022); 126041K (2023) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2674574
Event: 2nd International Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing (ICCAID 2022), 2022, Guangzhou, China

Abstract

Parallel allocation is a decentralized mechanism for allocating indivisible objects to agents, in which agents are allowed to report their favorite objects among the remaining goods parallelly. How to maximize the interests of self-interested agents while taking into account fairness has always been a hot research topic. In this paper, we study the loser-reporting policy which ensures that the difference between the number of items taken by the agents does not exceed one. In order to make the expected benefit obtained by the agent equal to the expected benefit obtained by the agent in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in parallel allocation, we come up with a concept of shelving disputes, and the SPNE strategy can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of objects.

Citation Download Citation

Wei Huang, Chao Huang, Xiaoyun Pang, and Liang Yuan "Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under loser reporting", Proc. SPIE 12604, International Conference on Computer Graphics, Artificial Intelligence, and Data Processing (ICCAID 2022), 126041K (23 May 2023); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2674574

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